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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we introduce the method of two-way coding,
a concept originating in communication theory characteriz-
ing coding schemes for two-way channels, into (networked)
feedback control systems under injection attacks. We first
show that the presence of two-way coding can distort the
perspective of the attacker on the control system. In general,
the distorted viewpoint on the attacker side as a consequence
of two-way coding will facilitate detecting the attacks, or
restricting what the attacker can do, or even correcting the
attack effect. In the particular case of zero-dynamics attacks,
if the attacks are to be designed according to the original
plant, then they will be easily detected; while if the attacks
are designed with respect to the equivalent plant as viewed
by the attacker, then under the additional assumption that
the plant is stabilizable by static output feedback, the attack
effect may be corrected in steady state.
KEYWORDS
Cyber-physical system, networked control system, cyber-
physical security, two-way channel, two-way coding, zero-
dynamics attack
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of two-way communication channels dates back
to Shannon [26]. As its name indicates, in two-way channels,
signals are transmitted simultaneously in both directions
between the two terminals of communication. Accordingly,
coding for two-way channels should make use of the infor-
mation contained in the data transmitted in both directions;
in other words, the coding schemes are also two-way, and
thus are referred to as two-way coding [3, 5, 18].
Inherently, the communication channels in networked
feedback control systems are two-way channels, with the
controller side and the plant side being viewed as the two
terminals of communication, respectively. Nevertheless, ap-
proaches based on two-way coding for the two-way channels
in networked feedback systems are rarely seen in the litera-
ture. One exception is the so-called scattering transformation
utilized in the tele-operation of robotics [2, 10, 11, 13, 21, 22];
in a broad sense, scattering transformation can be viewed
as a special class of two-way coding to resolve the issue of
two-way time delays, the most essential characterization
and the main issue of the two-way channels modeled on the
input-output level in the problem of tele-operation. Other
related applications of the scattering transformation include
[9, 16, 17].
Particularly in the cyber-physical security problems (see,
e.g., [1, 4, 8, 15, 20, 23–25, 27, 29, 32] and the references
therein) of networked control systems, to the best of our
knowledge, only one-way coding has been employed. The
authors of [31] introduced (one-way) encryption matrices
into control systems to achieve confidentiality and integrity.
In [19], the authors considered a method of coding (using
one-way coding matrices) the sensor outputs in order to
detect stealthy false data injection attacks in cyber-physical
systems. Modulation matrices, which are one-way, were in-
serted into cyber-physical systems in [12] to detect covert
attacks and zero-dynamics attacks. Dynamic one-way cod-
ing was applied to detect and isolate routing attacks [7] and
replay attacks [6]. For remote state estimation in the pres-
ence of eavesdroppers, the so-called state-secrecy codes were
introduced [30], which are also inherently one-way coding
schemes. On the other hand, as will be discussed in Section 4
of this paper, one-way coding has its inherent limitations;
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for instance, one-way coding in general cannot eliminate the
unstable poles nor nonminimum-phase zeros of the plant nor
the controller, which are most critical issues in the defense
against, e.g., zero-dynamics attacks [29].
In this paper, we investigate how two-way coding can
play an important role in protecting the security of feedback
control systems under injection attacks. We first introduce
a series of special classes of two-way coding, including the
two-way stretching, shearing, and rotation matrices, as well
as the scattering transformation. We then examine what
changes the presence of two-way coding will bring to the
feedback control system. On one hand, it is seen that on
the controller and reference side, the plant behaves exactly
as if two-way coding does not exist; as such, the controller
may be designed regardless of two-way coding. On the other,
two-way coding will distort the attacker’s perspective of the
signals and systems, i.e., the components of the feedback
loop, giving him/her a “transformed" view of the control
system, and making the behaviors of the plant, controller,
and reference all seemingly different from the those of the
original system without two-way coding.
More specifically, we examine how the presence of two-
way coding can play a critical role in the defense against
injection attacks. In general, the distorted perspective on
the attacker side as a result of two-way coding will enable
detecting the attacks or restricting what the attacker can
do or even correcting the attack effect, depending on the
attacker’s knowledge of the system. As a matter of fact, two-
way coding canmake the zeros and/or poles of the equivalent
plant as viewed by the attacker all different from those of
the original plant, and under some additional assumptions
(i.e., the plant is stabilizable by static output feedback), the
equivalent plant may even be made stable and/or minimum-
phase. In the particular case of zero-dynamics attacks, it is
then implicated that the attacks will be detected if designed
according to the original plant, while the attack effect may
be corrected in steady state if the attacks are to be designed
with respect to the equivalent plant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 is devoted to two-way coding. In Section 3, we intro-
duce two-way coding into linear time-invariant (LTI) feed-
back control systems under injection attacks, and show how
its presence can distort the perspective of the attacker. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the role two-way coding can play in the de-
fense against injection attacks, in particular, zero-dynamics
attacks. Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 TWO-WAY CODING
Consider the single-input single-output (SISO) system de-
picted in Fig. 1. Herein, K denotes the controller while P
denotes the plant. The reference signal is r (t) ∈ R and the
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Figure 1: A networked feedback system with two-way
coding.
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Figure 2: A networked feedback system with one-way
coding.
plant output isy (t) ∈ R. In addition, letu (t),u (t),y (t), q (t),
q (t), v (t), v (t) ∈ R.
Definition 2.1. The (static) two-way coding is defined as[
q (t)
y (t)
]
= M
[
u (t)
v (t)
]
, (1)
where
M =
[
a b
c d
]
. (2)
Herein, a,b, c,d ∈ R are chosen such that
ad , 0, ad − bc , 0. (3)
Strictly speaking, it should be further assumed that |ad − bc | <
∞.
Herein, two-way coding (operating in a feedback loop)
represents a two-way transformation that takes in the signal
in the forward path and the signal in the feedback path, and
outputs a new signal to the forward path and a second new
signal that passes on in the feedback path. In comparison,
Fig. 2 depicts a system with one-way coding schemes, which
are one-way transformations that either take in the signal in
the forward path and output a new signal that passes on in
the forward path, or input the signal in the feedback path and
output a signal that continues in the feedback path; herein,
α , β ∈ R and 0 < |α | , |β | < ∞.
For simplicity, we denote the inverse of two-way coding
M as [
a b
c d
]
= M−1 =
[ d
ad−bc − bad−bc− cad−bc aad−bc
]
, (4)
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Figure 3: A feedback system with two-way coding.
where a,b, c,d ∈ R. As illustrated on the plant side in Fig. 1,
the inverse of two-way codingM denotes another two-way
coding.
At this point, we do not impose any assumptions on the
controller K and plant P except that the closed-loop system
is stable; we now prove the following result for this generic
setting.
Proposition 2.2. If q (t) = q (t) and v (t) = v (t), then
u (t) = u (t) and y (t) = y (t).
Proof. Since[
q (t)
y (t)
]
=
[
a b
c d
] [
u (t)
v (t)
]
,
we have
u (t) = a−1q (t) − a−1bv (t) ,
and
y (t) = cu (t) + dv (t) = ca−1q (t) + (d − ca−1b) v (t) .
Similarly, since[
u (t)
v (t)
]
=
[
a b
c d
] [
q (t)
y (t)
]
,
and noting (4), we have
y (t) = −d−1cq (t) + d−1v (t) = ca−1q (t) + (d − ca−1b) v (t) ,
and
u (t) = aq (t) + by (t) =
(
a − bd−1c
)
q (t) + bd−1v (t)
= a−1q (t) − a−1bv (t) .
Clearly, when q (t) = q (t) and v (t) = v (t), it follows that
u (t) = u (t) and y (t) = y (t). □
In other words, if q (t) = q (t) and v (t) = v (t), the sys-
tem in Fig. 1, now equivalent to that of Fig. 3, reduces to
the system depicted in Fig. 4 as the “original" feedback sys-
tem without two-way coding. As such, properties, includ-
ing stability and performance, of the system in Fig. 1 when
q (t) = q (t) and v (t) = v (t) are equivalent to those of the
original system in Fig. 4.
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Figure 4: The original feedback system without two-
way coding.
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Figure 5: A networked feedback system with two-way
stretching matrix coding.
2.1 Special Cases of Two-Way Coding
We now consider some special cases of two-way coding
matrices. In what follows, we will introduce the (two-way)
stretching matrix, shearing matrix, rotation matrix, and so
on that are adapted from 2D computer graphics [14], as
well as the scattering transformation from tele-operation
[2, 10, 11, 13, 21, 22].
2.1.1 Two-Way Stretching Matrix. Below we list three cases
of the two-way stretching matrices.
Case 1:
M =
[
a 0
0 1
]
, a , 0.
Case 2:
M =
[
1 0
0 d
]
, d , 0.
Case 3:
M =
[
a 0
0 d
]
, ad , 0.
In the case when ad = 1, M is also known as the two-way
squeezing matrix.
The three cases of two-way stretching matrices are easy
to understand; they are simply re-scalings of the signals. We
now only illustrate case 3 in Fig. 5. Herein, it is easy to see
that a = 1/a and d = 1/d since
M−1 =
[ 1
a 0
0 1d
]
.
As a matter of fact, the two-way stretching matrices re-
duce to two one-way re-scaling transformations as one-way
K P
c c
r
y v
u q q u
yv
−
Figure 6: A networked feedback system with two-way
shearing matrix coding: case 1.
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Figure 7: A networked feedback system with two-way
shearing matrix coding: case 2.
coding schemes (cf. Fig. 2); we will discuss the differences be-
tween two-way coding and one-way coding in more details
in the subsequent sections.
2.1.2 Two-Way Shearing Matrix. Three cases of the two-way
shearing matrices are given below.
Case 1:
M =
[
1 0
c 1
]
, M−1 =
[
1 0
−c 1
]
.
In this case, we have the illustration given in Fig. 6, where c =
−c . Simply speaking, the idea is to create a “parallel system"
on the plant side, and compensate for it on the controller
side.
Case 2:
M =
[
1 b
0 1
]
, M−1 =
[
1 −b
0 1
]
.
In this case, we have the illustration given in Fig. 7, where
b = −b. The idea is to add a “local feedback controller" on
the plant side, and compensate for it on the controller side.
Case 3:
M =
[
1 b
c 1
]
, M−1 =
[
1 −b
−c 1
]
.
Herein, bc , 1. In this case, we have the illustration given in
Fig. 8, where b = −b and c = −c .
2.1.3 Two-Way Rotation Matrix. The two-way rotation ma-
trix and its inverse are given by
M =
[
cosθ sinθ
− sinθ cosθ
]
, M−1 =
[
cosθ − sinθ
sinθ cosθ
]
.
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Figure 8: A networked feedback system with two-way
shearing matrix coding: case 3.
Herein, θ , kπ/2,k = 2m + 1,m ∈ Z.
2.1.4 Scattering Transformation. The scattering transforma-
tion is given by [2, 10, 11, 13, 21, 22][
q (t)
v (t)
]
=
[ √
2
2
√
2
2
−
√
2
2
√
2
2
] [ √
γ 0
0 1√γ
] [
u (t)
y (t)
]
=

√
2γ
2
√
2
2√γ
−
√
2γ
2
√
2
2√γ

[
u (t)
y (t)
]
.
Herein, 0 < γ < ∞. As a consequence,[
q (t)
y (t)
]
=
[ √
2γ 1
γ
√
2γ
] [
u (t)
v (t)
]
.
Correspondingly,
M =
[ √
2γ 1
γ
√
2γ
]
, M−1 =

√
2
γ − 1γ
−1
√
2
γ
 .
More generally, the scattering transformation can be ex-
tended as [2, 10, 11, 13, 21, 22][
q (t)
v (t)
]
=
[
cosθ sinθ
− sinθ cosθ
] [ √
γ 0
0 1√γ
] [
u (t)
y (t)
]
=
[ √
γ cosθ 1√γ sinθ
−√γ sinθ 1√γ cosθ
] [
u (t)
y (t)
]
.
Herein, 0 < γ < ∞ and θ , kπ/2,k = 2m + 1,m ∈ Z. As a
result, [
q (t)
y (t)
]
=
[ √
γ
cos θ tanθ
γ tanθ
√
γ
cos θ
] [
u (t)
v (t)
]
,
and
M =
[ √
γ
cos θ tanθ
γ tanθ
√
γ
cos θ
]
, M−1 =
[ 1√
γ cos θ − tan θγ
− tanθ 1√γ cos θ
]
.
3 ANALYSIS OF LTI SYSTEMS WITH
TWO-WAY CODING
In this section, we analyze in particular LTI feedback control
systems. Consider the SISO feedback system with two-way
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Figure 9: A feedback system with two-way coding un-
der injection attacks.
coding depicted in Fig. 9. Assume that herein the controller
K and plant P are LTI with transfer functions K (s) and P (s),
respectively. In addition, let r (t), u (t), u (t), y (t), y (t), q (t),
q (t),v (t),v (t) ∈ R. Meanwhile, suppose that injection (addi-
tive) attacksw (t) ∈ R and z (t) ∈ R exist in the forward path
and feedback path of the control systems, respectively. Let
R (s), U (s), U (s), Y (s), Y (s), Q (s), Q (s), V (s), V (s),W (s),
Z (s) represent the Laplace transforms, assuming that they
exist, of the signals r (t),u (t),u (t),y (t),y (t),q (t),q (t),v (t),
v (t),w (t), z (t). From now on, we assume that all the trans-
fer functions of the systems are with zero initial conditions,
unless otherwise specified.
We first provide expressions for the Laplace transforms
of the real plant output y (t) and the plant output y (t) as
seen on the controller side, given reference r (t) and under
injection attacksw (t) and z (t).
Theorem 3.1. Consider the SISO feedback system with two-
way coding under injection attacks depicted in Fig. 9. Assume
that controller K and plant P are LTI with transfer functions
K (s) and P (s), respectively, and that the closed-loop system is
stable. Then,
Y (s) = K (s) P (s)1 + K (s) P (s)R (s) +
a−1 [1 + cK (s)] P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s) W (s)
+
a−1 [b − (ad − bc)K (s)] P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) , (5)
and
Y (s) = K (s) P (s)1 + K (s) P (s)R (s) +
a−1 [P (s) − c]
1 + K (s) P (s)W (s)
+
a−1 [ad − bc + bP (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) . (6)
Proof. Since
Y (s) = P (s)U (s) ,
and
U (s) = bY (s) + aQ (s) ,
we have
U (s) = bP (s)U (s) + aQ (s) ,
and thus
U (s) = aQ (s)
1 − bP (s)
.
Correspondingly,
Y (s) = P (s)U (s) = aP (s)Q (s)
1 − bP (s)
.
As a consequence,
V (s) = dY (s) + cQ (s) = adP (s)Q (s)
1 − bP (s)
+ cQ (s)
=
[
adP (s)
1 − bP (s)
+ c
]
Q (s) =
(
ad − bc
)
P (s) + c
1 − bP (s)
Q (s)
=
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)Q (s) . (7)
Similarly, since
U (s) = K (s) [R (s) − Y (s)] ,
and
Y (s) = cU (s) + dV (s) ,
we have
Y (s) = cK (s) [R (s) − Y (s)] + dV (s) ,
and hence
Y (s) = cK (s)R (s) + dV (s)1 + cK (s) .
In addition,
U (s) = K (s) [R (s) − Y (s)]
= K (s)R (s) − K (s) [cK (s)R (s) + dV (s)]1 + cK (s)
=
K (s) [R (s) − dV (s)]
1 + cK (s) .
Thus,
Q (s) = aU (s) + bV (s)
=
aK (s)
1 + cK (s)R (s) −
adK (s)
1 + cK (s)V (s) + bV (s)
=
aK (s)
1 + cK (s)R (s) +
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s) V (s)
=
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s)
[
aK (s)
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
]
R (s)
+
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s) V (s) . (8)
Using (7) and (8), while noting that
Q (s) = Q (s) +W (s) ,
and
V (s) = V (s) + Z (s) ,
we may then obtain that
Q (s) = Q (s) +W (s)
=W (s) + aK (s)1 + cK (s)R (s) +
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s) V (s)
=W (s) + aK (s)1 + cK (s)R (s)
+
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s)
[
V (s) + Z (s)
]
=W (s) + aK (s)1 + cK (s)R (s)
+
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s)
[
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)
]
Q (s)
+
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s) Z (s) .
Hence,{
1 − b − (ad − bc)K (s)1 + cK (s)
[
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)
]}
Q (s)
=W (s) + aK (s)1 + cK (s)R (s) +
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s) Z (s) .
On the other hand,
1 − b − (ad − bc)K (s)1 + cK (s)
[
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)
]
=
[1 + cK (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)]
[1 + cK (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)]
− [b − (ad − bc)K (s)] [P (s) − c][1 + cK (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)]
=
ad [1 + K (s) P (s)]
[1 + cK (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)] .
As a result,
Q (s) = d
−1K (s) [ad − bc + bP (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) R (s)
+
a−1d−1 [1 + cK (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) W (s)
+
a−1d−1 [b − (ad − bc)K (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) .
Thus,
Y (s) = aP (s)Q (s)
1 − bP (s)
=
dP (s)Q (s)
ad − bc + bP (s)
=
K (s) P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s)R (s) +
a−1 [1 + cK (s)] P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s) W (s)
+
a−1 [b − (ad − bc)K (s)] P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) .
Similarly, we have
V (s) = V (s) + Z (s) = P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)Q (s) + Z (s)
=
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s) [Q (s) +W (s)] + Z (s)
=
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)
[
aK (s)
1 + cK (s)
]
R (s)
+
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)
[
b − (ad − bc)K (s)
1 + cK (s)
]
V (s)
+
P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s)W (s) + Z (s) ,
and
V (s) = d
−1K (s) [P (s) − c]
1 + K (s) P (s) R (s)
+
a−1d−1 [1 + cK (s)] [P (s) − c]
1 + K (s) P (s) W (s)
+
a−1d−1 [1 + cK (s)] [ad − bc + bP (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) .
Consequently,
Y (s) = cK (s)R (s) + dV (s)1 + cK (s)
=
K (s) P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s)R (s) +
a−1 [P (s) − c]
1 + K (s) P (s)W (s)
+
a−1 [ad − bc + bP (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) .
This completes the proof. □
Note that based on Theorem 3.1, Laplace transforms of all
the signals flowing in the feedback system can be obtained.
For instance, since Y (s) = P (s)U (s), it follows from (5) that
plant inputU (s) is given by
U (s) = K (s)1 + K (s) P (s)R (s) +
a−1 [1 + cK (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) W (s)
+
a−1 [b − (ad − bc)K (s)]
1 + K (s) P (s) Z (s) . (9)
We now investigate the implications of Theorem 3.1. It is
clear that from the perspective of the reference, the transfer
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Figure 10: A feedback system with two-way coding:
from the viewpoint of the attacker.
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Figure 11: A feedback system with two-way coding:
the equivalent system from the attacker’s viewpoint.
K P
y
u u
y
w
z
r
−
Figure 12: The original feedback system without two-
way coding.
function from reference R (s) to plant output Y (s), found as
K (s) P (s)
1 + K (s) P (s) , (10)
stays exactly the same as in the original system depicted in
Fig. 12 where two-way coding does not exist; therein, the
transfer function from reference R (s) to plant output Y (s)
is also given by (10). As such, the controller K (s) may be
designed regardless of two-way coding. Meanwhile, to the
attacker, the feedback system behaves differently from the
original system because of the presence of two-way coding,
as will be shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. From the viewpoint of the attacker (see
Fig. 10), the feedback system is equivalent to that of Fig. 11,
where the transfer function of the equivalent plant P is given
by
P (s) = P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s) , (11)
while that of the equivalent controller K is found as
K (s) = b − (ad − bc)K (s)1 + cK (s) . (12)
In addition, the Laplace transform of the equivalent reference
signal r is
R (s) = aK (s)
b − (ad − bc)K (s)R (s) . (13)
Proof. Equations (11), (12), and (13) follow directly from
(7) and (8). □
Clearly, the presence of two-way coding will distort the
attacker’s view of the control system, making the properties
of the plant, controller, and reference all seemingly different
from those of the original system. This distorted perspective
will assist in defending the system against attacks that are
designed based on the system models, as will be seen shortly
in the next section.
4 ATTACK DETECTION AND
CORRECTION
In this section, we examine how the presence of two-way
coding can play a critical role in the defense against injection
attacks in LTI systems. In general, the distorted perspective
on the attacker side as a result of two-way coding will enable
detecting the attacks or restricting what the attacker can
do or even correcting the attack effect, depending on the
attacker’s knowledge of the system. In the particular case
of zero-dynamics attacks, it is seen that the attacks will be
detected if designed according to the original plant, while the
attack effect will be corrected in steady state if the attacks
are to be designed with respect to the equivalent plant as
seen by the attacker.
Before we proceed, we first prove the following result.
Consider still the SISO feedback system depicted in Fig. 9.
Without physically changing P (s), we can use two-way cod-
ing to make the zeros and/or poles of the equivalent plant
P (s), as seen by the attacker, all different from those of the
original plant P (s).
Theorem 4.1. Let
P (s) = mP (s)
nP (s) , (14)
wheremP (s) andnP (s) denote the numerator and denominator
polynomials of P (s), respectively. Suppose that mP (s) and
nP (s) are coprime.
• The zeros of P (s) are given by the roots of
mP (s) − cnP (s) = 0. (15)
In addition, if c , 0, then the zeros of P (s) are all differ-
ent from those of P (s).
• The poles of P (s) are given by the roots of
(ad − bc)nP (s) + bmP (s) = 0. (16)
In addition, if b , 0, then the poles of P (s) are all differ-
ent from those of P (s).
Proof. It is clear that
P (s) = P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s) =
mP (s) − cnP (s)
(ad − bc)nP (s) + bmP (s) .
Note that the zeros of P (s) are given by the roots of
mP (s) = 0. Let zi be a zero of P (s). Hence, mP (zi ) = 0.
Then, zi cannot be a zero of P (s), otherwise this will lead
to nP (zi ) =mP (zi ) /c = 0 and thus zi will be a pole of P (s),
which contradicts the fact thatmP (s) and nP (s) are coprime.
Similarly, note that the poles of P (s) are given by the roots
of nP (s) = 0. Let pi be a pole of P (s). Therefore, nP (pi ) = 0.
Then, pi cannot be a pole of P (s), otherwise this will lead to
mP (pi ) = (ad − bc)nP (pi ) /b = 0 and thus pi will be a zero
of P (s), which contradicts the fact thatmP (s) and nP (s) are
coprime. □
Note that herein the conditions c , 0 and/or b , 0 are
essential. Similarly to Theorem 4.1, it can also be shown that
the zeros of K (s) are all different from those of K (s) when
b , 0, while the poles of K (s) are all different from those of
K (s) when c , 0.
We now remark on some fundamental differences between
two-way coding and one-way coding. It is clear that two-
way coding reduces to two one-way coding schemes when
b = c = 0 (as in the case of two-way stretching matrix; see
Section 2.1.1), and correspondingly,
P (s) = P (s)
ad
, K (s) = adK (s) . (17)
It is clear that the zeros and poles of P (s) and K (s) are ex-
actly the same as those of P (s) andK (s). In other words, one-
way coding will not change the zeros nor poles of the plant
nor the controller. Indeed, similar results hold for multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) systems as well. It is also
worth mentioning that even with dynamic one-way coding
schemes, since cancellations between unstable poles and
nonminimum-phase zeros should always be avoided to pre-
vent possible internal instability, the nonminimum-phase
zeros and unstable poles of the original plant and controller
cannot be eliminated.
We next show that the presence of two-way coding not
only can make the zeros and/or poles of the equivalent plant
P (s) all different from those of the original plant P (s), but
also, under some additional conditions, may render P (s)
stable and/or minimum-phase. In fact, similar results hold
for the pair of the equivalent controllerK (s) and the original
controller K (s) as well.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that a minimal realization of the
plant P (s) is given by{ Ûx (t) = Ax (t) + Bu (t) ,
y (t) = Cx (t) + Du (t) . (18)
If the plant is stabilizable by static output feedback [28] de-
scribed as
u (t) = Fy (t) , (19)
where F ∈ R, then all the poles of P (s) can be made stable,
while all the zeros of P (s) can be made minimum-phase.
Proof. Since (18) is a minimal realization of P (s), we have
P (s) = mP (s)
nP (s) = C (sI −A)
−1 B + D.
Meanwhile, since P is stabilizable by static output feedback,
there exists a non-zero constant F1 such that
1
1 + F1
[
C (sI −A)−1 B + D] = 11 + F1 [mP (s)nP (s) ]
=
nP (s)
nP (s) + F1mP (s)
is stable, i.e., all its poles are stable. In other words, all the
roots of nP (s) + F1mP (s) are with negative real parts. Mean-
while, note that
P (s) = P (s) − c
ad − bc + bP (s) =
mP (s) − cnP (s)
(ad − bc)nP (s) + bmP (s) .
As such, when b/(ad − bc) = F1,
(ad − bc)nP (s) + bmP (s) = (ad − bc) [nP (s) + F1mP (s)] ,
and hence all its roots are with negative real parts, i.e., all the
poles of P (s) are stable. Similarly, when c = −1/F2, where
F2 is a stabilizing, non-zero static output feedback control
gain, we have
mP (s) − cnP (s) = −c [nP (s) + F2mP (s)] ,
and thus all its roots are with negative real parts, i.e., all the
zeros of P (s) are minimum-phase. □
From the proof, it can be seen that it is possible to make all
the poles of P (s) stable and all the zeros of P (s) minimum-
phase simultaneously, as long as F1 , F2.
It is also worth mentioning that herein we only require
the plant to be stabilizable by static output feedback F , which
is used merely for the purpose of deciding the parameters of
two-way coding, but the controller K (s) is not necessarily
chosen among such static controllers; stated alternatively,
the controller K (s) are not further restricted.
4.1 Zero-Dynamics Attacks
We next examine the implications of Theorem 4.1 and The-
orem 4.2 in the attack detection and correction of zero-
dynamics attacks [29]. Consider first the original system in
Fig. 12. For zero-dynamics attacks, the typical attack design
is to let Z (s) = 0 and
W (s) = w0
s − ζ , (20)
where ζ is a zero of P (s). It is known that if w0 is chosen
correspondingly, then the attack cannot be detected, as a
consequence of the blocking property of zeros.
Consider next the system with two-way coding in Fig. 9
where the equivalent plant from the perspective of the at-
tacker is given by P (s). If the zero-dynamics attacks are still
designed in terms of the zeros of P (s), then they will easily
be detected as long as c , 0, since the zeros of P (s) are all
different from those of P (s).
On the other hand, if the attacker somehow knows P (s)
(e.g., by carrying out system identification based on q (t) and
v (t), or by knowing a,b, c,d as well as P (s)) and designs the
zero-dynamics attacks accordingly, then the attacks cannot
be detected. In this case, note that if the plant P is stabilizable
by static output feedback, then all the zeros of P (s) can be
mademinimum-phase. As a result, only stable zero-dynamics
attacks are possible, meaning that the attack signal and hence
the attack response will be zero in steady state; in such a
case, we say that the attack effect can be corrected.
We summarize the above discussions in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.3. Consider the system with two-way coding
in Fig. 9 under zero-dynamics attack given by (20).
• If the zero-dynamics attack is designed according to P (s),
then it can always be detected with c , 0.
• If the zero-dynamics attack is designed with respect to
P (s), then, supposing that the plant P is stabilizable by
static output feedback, all the zeros of P (s) can be made
minimum-phase, in which case the attack effect will be
corrected in steady state.
Note also that for zero-dynamics attacks, the attacker may
instead choose to letW (s) = 0 and
Z (s) = z0
s − λ , (21)
where λ is a pole of P (s) (and hence a zero of the closed-
loop system from z (t) to plant output y (t)). If z0 is chosen
correspondingly, then the attack cannot be detected. Sim-
ilarly, in the system with two-way coding in Fig. 9, if the
zero-dynamics attacks are still designed in terms of the poles
of P (s), they will easily be detected as long as b , 0, since
the poles of P (s) are all different from those of P (s). On the
other hand, if the attacker knows P (s) and designs the zero-
dynamics attacks accordingly, then the attacks cannot be
detected. In this case, note that if the plant P is stabilizable
by static output feedback, then all the poles of P (s) can be
made stable. As a consequence, only stable zero-dynamics
attacks are possible, meaning that the attack effect will be
zero in steady state; in such a situation, the attack effect is
said to be corrected.
Similarly, we summarize the previous discussions in the
corollary below.
Corollary 4.4. Consider the system with two-way coding
in Fig. 9 under zero-dynamics attack given by (21).
• If the zero-dynamics attack is designed according to P (s),
then it can always be detected with b , 0.
• If the zero-dynamics attack is designed with respect to
P (s), then, supposing that the plant P is stabilizable by
static output feedback, all the poles of P (s) can be made
stable, in which case the attack effect will be corrected
in steady state.
When the zero-dynamics attacks (20) and (21) happen
simultaneously, it is clear that Corollary 4.3 and Corollary 4.4
apply respectively to the two attacks.
It might also be interesting to examine what changes two-
way coding can bring to the detection and correction of other
classes of injection attacks; see, e.g., [23]. We will, however,
leave those investigations to future research.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the method of two-way coding into feed-
back control systems under injection attacks.We have shown
that the presence of two-way coding can distort the perspec-
tive of the attacker on the control system; this distorted view
on the attacker side was demonstrated to facilitate detecting
the attacks, or restricting what the attacker can do, or even
correcting the attack effect in steady state. Future research di-
rections include the analysis of MIMO systems, discrete-time
systems, as well as other classes of attacks in the presence
of two-way coding.
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